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The Impact of No Child Left Behind on
Post-Divorce Custody Modification
Steven J. Seemt

In 2001, Congress passed the No Child Left Behind Act
("NCLB"), 1 a massive legislative effort in national school reform.
The stated purpose of the Act is "to ensure that all children have
a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality
education and reach, at a minimum, proficiency on challenging
state academic achievement standards and state academic assessments." 2 In an effort to fulfill this purpose, NCLB requires
that local education agencies allow children in "failing" schools to
transfer to a non-failing school in the same school district. 3 These
school choice provisions trigger in every school district after two
years of monitoring. 4 As the NCLB transfer provisions take effect, they may have significant implications for the determination of child custody.
Courts initially make custody decisions using a combination
of factors, but the decisions are almost always within a framework that gives primary consideration to the best interests of the
child. 5 Similarly, courts modify existing custody decrees either
using a traditional best interests standard, or, more frequently,
using a restricted best interests standard that requires a sub6
stantial change in circumstances.
t A.B. 2001, Princeton University; J.D. Candidate 2005, University of Chicago.
1 Pub L 107-110, 115 Stat 1425 (2001), codified at 20 USC § 6301 et seq (2002).
2 20 USC § 6301.
3 See 20 USC § 6316(b)(1)(E)(i).
4 See 20 USC § 6316(b)(1)(A).
5 See Robert H. Mnookin and D. Kelly Weisberg, Child, Family, and the State: Problems and Materials on Children and the Law § 5 at 913 & n 92 (Aspen 2000) (noting that
the best interests standard "has been uniformly adopted either by state statutes, which
include expanded lists of relevant factors, or by statutes giving courts a general directive," and describing the complexity of factors that may go into a best interests analysis).
6 See Nancy B. Shernow, Comment, Recognizing Rights of Custodial Parents: The
Primacy of the Post-Divorce Family in Child Custody Modification Proceedings,35 UCLA
L Rev 677, 680-83 (1988) (noting that most jurisdictions apply either a substantial change

in circumstances standard or a best interests standard, regardless of whether there has
been a change in circumstances, in modifying custody decrees, and briefly describing
those standards).
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The NCLB school choice provisions may affect court custody
modification decisions under either standard. Under a traditional best interests of the child standard, a noncustodial parent
can successfully relitigate custody based on the need for either a
better school 7 or a shorter commute8 for the child. Under a substantial change in circumstances standard, a custody order may
also require modification due to either the classification of the
child's school as "failing" or the longer commute resulting from
school transfer. Thus, the interplay of NCLB and divorce law
may disparately impact a divorced custodial parent regardless of
whether the child actually transfers schools.
Part I of this Comment describes the public school choice
provisions of NCLB. It also examines the various judicial standards used to establish and modify child custody decrees. Part II
analyzes hypothetical combinations of factual circumstances and
legal standards, and critiques the public school choice provisions
of NCLB based on their possible effects on custody litigation.
This Comment argues that the interplay between NCLB and custody modification standards may create a number of problematic
incentives, including redundant relitigation by noncustodial parents, counterproductive educational decisionmaking by custodial
parents, and over-reliance on inappropriate data by judges. Part
II also argues that these incentives may create two derivative
problems: disparate impact on certain groups and methodological
bias within the judiciary.
Part III recommends three possible remedies for the problematic intersection of the NCLB school choice provisions with
the common judicial standards for divorce law: a full legislative
repeal, a partial legislative amendment, or a judicial presumption. This Comment then argues that while a partial legislative
solution might provide more national uniformity and clarity for
judges, a judicial solution provides both the most realistic option
from an implementation standpoint and the most equitable
choice from a parents' and children's rights standpoint.

7 See Beers v Beers, 710 A2d 1206, 1209-10 (Pa Super 1998) (affirming that school
quality is relevant to a best interests of the child inquiry).
8 See In the Interest of ZBP and JNP, 109 SW3d 772, 779 (Tex App 2003) (affirming
that a long commute to school may be probative in custody disputes).
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I. No CHILD LEFT BEHIND AND COMMON LAW
DIVORCE STANDARDS

A.

No Child Left Behind Legislation

NCLB requires that all states develop challenging academic
standards and then implement a system of annual testing to determine whether schools meet those state-mandated educational
standards. 9 States must then use the results of these tests to determine whether their schools have made "adequate yearly progress" in their educational programs. 10 Schools which fail to
make adequate yearly progress for two consecutive years are
identified for "school improvement."" NCLB has created statistical requirements for adequate yearly progress. The law demands
either complete achievement of the given state's minimum proficiency levels or, alternately, 10 percent yearly decreases in the
number of non-proficient students. 2 NCLB extensively details
the conditions needed for state assessments of proficiency, requiring linkage to test scores, disaggregation by demographic
3
factors, and itemization of score analyses.
If a state identifies a school as needing school improvement,
the local education agency must provide all students enrolled in
the school with the option to transfer to another public school in
the district that the state has not identified for improvement. 4
In addition, local education agencies must give priority to transfers involving the "lowest achieving children from low-income
15
families."
B.

Law Governing Initial Determination and Subsequent Modification of Custody Decrees

States apply different standards both in making initial determinations of custody and in making orders modifying custody.
Consequently, a description of both sets of standards could assist
9 See 20 USC § 6311(b)(2)-(3) (mandating the creation of statewide accountability
and academic assessment programs, including timelines, definitions of adequate yearly
progress for state school systems, and specific educational goals).
10 20 USC § 6316(a)(1)(A).
11 20 USC § 6316(b)(1)(A).
12 20 USC § 6311(b)(2)(I).
13 See 20 USC § 6311(b)(3)(A)-(C) (delineating the manner in which state education
agencies must create programs of academic assessment and use those assessment programs to monitor and evaluate state school systems).
14 20 USC § 6316(b)(1)(E)(i).
15 See 20 USC § 6316(b)(1)(E)(ii).

628

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2004:

an analysis of the various interests that courts should weigh in
custody litigation. The NCLB school choice provisions, however,
more clearly intersect with the standards governing custody
modification than with those governing initial decrees. Accordingly, while the standards for initial custody determinations help
establish the traditional baseline for analysis in post-divorce custody determinations, the standards dealing with custody modification warrant more attention, and so this Comment focuses on
the effect of NCLB during modification proceedings.
1.

Initial determinations.

In making initial determinations of custody, states typically
apply a best interests of the child standard. 16 The general best
interests standard encompasses myriad elements, and states
have adopted varying combinations of these elements. 17 Some
commentators have referred to other presumptions and factors,
such as the primary caretaker presumption or the child's wishes,
as "standards" for custody determination, 8 but most of these fall
within the best interests inquiry. For instance, the primary caretaker presumption fits into the best interests standard because
courts find that it generally serves the best interests of the child
for him to remain in the custody of his primary caretaker. 19
Courts treat the child's wishes, on the other hand, as neither a
standard nor a presumption, but rather as just one factor among
many to consider in the best interests analysis. 20 Of course, a
child's preferences may control if the child is old enough for the

16 See Jeff Atkinson, CriteriaFor Deciding Child Custody in the Trial and Appellate
Courts, 18 Fam L Q 1, 4 (1984) (noting that the best interests standard is the "universal
standard" for initial custody determinations).
17 See Harvey R. Sorkow, Best Interests of the Child: By Whose Definition?, 18 Pepp L
Rev 383, 386 & n 21 (1991), citing Doris Jonas Freed and Henry H. Foster, Family Law in
The Fifty States: An Overview, 16 Fain L Q 289, 350 (1983) (noting the various state conceptions of the best interests standard, and the varying factors that may be included).
is See Joan B. Kelly, The Determination of Child Custody in the USA, available
online at <http'//www.islandnet.com/-wwlia/us-cus3.htm#fact> (visited May 3, 2004)
(noting that there are three main "standards" for determining custody: best interests,
primary caregiver, and the child's wishes).
19 See, for example, Spear v Spear, 506 SE2d 820, 823 (W Va 1998) (noting that with
regard to very young children, the law presumes that it is in the child's best interests to
place the child with their primary caretaker).
20 See Mnookin and Weisberg, Child, Family, and the State, § 5 at 992-93 (cited in
note 5) (describing the various manners in which state statutes incorporate the consideration of the child's wishes in custody decisionmaking, ranging from an outright requirement to complete court discretion, but only as a controlling factor if the child is of a
certain age).
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court to fully credit his desires. 21 All told, despite the varying
subtleties among state laws, courts generally employ some form
22
of a best interests analysis.
The exact definition of "custody," however, remains significantly complex. Two notions of custody have evolved in the lawphysical and legal. 23 Legal custody implies responsibility for decisions regarding, for instance, a child's long-term health, welfare, and education; whereas physical custody involves control
over a child's home and daily activities. 24 This dichotomy becomes more complex with the addition of joint custody. Joint
physical custody is more like divided, time-share custody,
whereas joint legal custody implies that both parents share a
voice in major decisions regarding the child's upbringing. 25
Courts generally favor joint legal custody over joint physical custody; an empirical study indicated that one court awarded joint
legal custody fifteen times more often than it awarded joint
physical custody. 26 Another study showed that the percentage of
Wisconsin divorce cases ending in joint legal custody increased
from 18 to over 81 percent in the twelve year period between
1980-92.27
The most dire scenarios arising from the intersection of
NCLB and custody modification law arise when physical and legal custody rest solely with one parent and the other parent dislikes the arrangement and is willing to challenge it in court. Accordingly, this Comment addresses cases involving a post-divorce
couple with sole legal and physical custody vested in one parent.
The word "custodial" as used in this Comment implies both
physical and legal custody, except where otherwise specified.
Therefore, a "custodial parent" within the meaning of this Comment has sole legal and physical custody of his child.
21 See id at 993 and n 171-72 (describing certain state statutes that mandate a child's
preferences as controlling in custody determinations, provided that the child has reached
a sufficient age cutoff or maturity level).
22 See id at 913 (noting that the best interests standard has been uniformly adopted
by statutes either giving expanded lists of relevant factors or a broad general directive).
2 See id at 951 (describing the existence of both legal and physical custody, and the
various aspects of parental decisionmaking encompassed by each).
24 See Mnookin and Weisberg, Child, Family, and the State, § 5 at 951 (cited in note

5).
25

See id.

See W.P.C. Phear et al, An EmpiricalStudy of Custody Arrangements: Joint Versus
Sole Legal Custody, in Jay Folberg, ed, Joint Custody and Shared Parenting 142, 156
(Bureau of National Affairs 1984).
27 See Marygold S. Melli, Patricia R. Brown, and Maria Cancian, Child Custody in a
Changing World: A Study of Postdivorce Arrangements in Wisconsin, 1997 U Ill L Rev
773, 778.
26

630

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

2.

[2004:

Modification of decrees.

In determining whether to modify a custody order, courts
employ different standards than they apply in initial decree decisions. In modification proceedings, courts typically ask one of two
questions: "(1) Has there been a material or substantial change
of circumstances since the initial custody decree such that modification will be in the child's best interests? [or] (2) Will modification be in the best interests of the child regardless of whether
28
there has been any change of circumstances?"
In determining whether a substantial change in circumstances has occurred, courts consider such factors as the remarriage or improvement in financial condition of the noncustodial
parent, the child's increased age, the child's performance in
school, or the possibility that the custodial parent will move out
of the jurisdiction. 29 A substantial change in these factors may
influence a court to modify a custody determination. 30 The substantial change of circumstances standard remains very vague,
31
however, and generally results in significant judicial discretion.
Modifications may flow from "irrelevant, predictable, or even improved changes in the prior custodian's circumstances," or from
"unexplained prejudices, which appellate review cannot correct."32 Accordingly, the substantial change in circumstances
standard may create some incentives for noncustodial parents to
attempt custody modification, and thus may not act as a deter33
rent to litigation.
As a practical matter, however, courts systematically disfavor modifying custody decrees. 34 The traditional change in circumstances rule derives from the rationale that "the child's need

2 Shernow, Recognizing Rights of Custodial Parents at 680-83 (cited in note 6). See
also J. David Roellgen, The New Indiana Child Custody Modification Standard, 38 Res
Gestae 44-46 (1994) (providing a comparison between the substantial change of circumstances standard for custody modification and the best interests of the child standard).
29 See C. Gail Vasterling, Child Custody Modification Under the Uniform Marriage
and DivorceAct: A Statute to End the Tug-of-War?, 67 Wash U L Q 923, 928-29 (1989).
30

Id at 929.

31 See id at 930.
32 Id (citations omitted).
3 See Vasterling, 67 Wash U L Q at 930 (cited in note 29) (claiming that judicial
discretion in custody modification hearings leads to indeterminable outcomes, and thus
encourages, rather than discourages, relitigation).
3 See Mnookin and Weisberg, Child, Family, and the State, § 5 at 997 and n 184
(cited in note 5) (describing the substantial change in circumstances standard as deriving
from the principle that the need for stability militates against relitigation of custody
issues, and indicating that some states follow an even stricter standard).
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for stability militates against relitigation of custody issues." 35
Furthermore, some states follow the stricter rule of the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act ("UMDA"), which forbids modification
within two years after. the initial decree, absent danger to the
child's physical, mental, moral, or emotional health.36 Under this
analysis, the change in circumstances standard occasionally may
deter litigation, due to the apparent institutional disfavoring of
modification. Some incentives for litigation may still flow from
this standard, however, especially as it interacts with the NCLB
school transfer provisions.
Generally, the custodial parent maintains sole control over
decisions affecting a child's education unless such a choice creates a substantial change in circumstances. 37 At least one court
has concluded that a custodial parent's decision to home-school
her child can represent a substantial change in circumstances
warranting a modification of a custody order. 38 Other courts,
however, have held that a change in a child's school may not itself constitute a sufficient basis for changing a custody arrangement.39 Instead, trial courts have used factors such as the quality
of education and length of commute in determining whether to
modify custody. For instance, New York courts have treated differences in the quality of the child's education as probative in
custody disputes, 40 and Nebraska courts have used educational
quality in determining whether there is "an affirmative showing
that the [custodial parent's decision regarding schooling] has injured or harmed . . . the child's safety, well-being, or health,
whether physical or mental."4 1 Courts also have treated long
5

Id.

36 Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 409, 9A ULA 439 (1998 & Supp 1999).
37 See J. Bart McMahon, Note, An Examination of the Non-Custodial Parent'sRight
to Influence and Direct the Child's Education: What Happens When the Custodial Parent
Wants to Home-Educate the Child, 33 U of Louisville J of Fain L 723, 743 (1995) (noting
that "[c]ase law still supports the general proposition that decisions affecting the child's
education remain with custodial parent, unless such a choice amounts to a substantial
and material change in circumstances warranting a change of custody to protect the
child"), citing Gardini v Moyer, 575 NE2d 423 (Ohio 1991).
3 See Gardini, 575 NE2d at 427 (holding, without addressing the propriety of home
schooling per se, that there was sufficient evidence in the trial record to support a finding
that home schooling was inappropriate and harmful to the children at issue).
39 See Collins v Newton, 362 S2d 174, 175 (Fla App 1978) (holding that the fact that
child was about to enter high school was not a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant a change in custody).
40 See, for example, Cassano v Cassano, 612 NYS2d 160, 162 (NY 1994) (holding that
real differences in educational quality among a child's school options should be a factor
considered in the determination of custody).
41 Von Tersch v Von Tersch, 455 NW2d 130, 136 (Neb 1990). The court in Von Tersch
did not reach the specific question of whether the educational quality of the relevant
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daily commutes to school as relevant in deciding whether to mod42
ify custody decrees.
Conflicts of interest frequently arise between custodial and
noncustodial parents in determining how to educate their children. 43 The general custody rule gives the custodial parent default control over the child's education, to the exclusion of the
noncustodial parent." In fact, control of education is part of the
bundle of rights generally associated with legal custody. 45 This
rule derives from the notion that custodial parents have more
contact with the child, and therefore have a better understanding
46
of the child's needs.
The noncustodial parent, however, does have some recourse
in the face of these presumptions. For instance, courts can craft
initial custody decrees such that the noncustodial parent has decisionmaking power over the child's education.4 7 Custodial par48
ents often face significant barriers in attacking such decrees.
Furthermore, the noncustodial parent sometimes can trump the
public schools was inappropriate. Yet even when the educational quality is inappropriate,
courts still may be reluctant to alter custody arrangements. See Davidson v Colburn,
.1994 WL 654634 at *8-9 (Neb App) (unpublished) (holding that despite clear harm to the
child stemming from the custodial parent's decision to home school, less restrictive remedies were available than a physical custody shift).
42 See In the Interest of ZBP and JNP, 109 SW3d 772, 779 (Tex App 2003) (affirming
the trial court's use of a daily two-hour commute to and from school as relevant to the
change in physical custody from mother to father); Erickson v Erickson, 1999 WL
1216132 at *2 (Minn App) (unpublished) (holding that a one-hour commute had a significant effect on the child's best interests).
43 Consider Gardini, 575 NE2d 423; Zande v Zande, 164 SE2d 523 (NC App 1968);
Esteb v Esteb, 244 P 264 (Wash 1926); Davidson, 1994 WL 654634.
4 See, for example, Bateman v Bateman, 159 SE2d 387, 390 (Ga 1968) (holding that
a non-custodial father lost his right to control the education of his child when he lost
custody of the child); Zande, 164 SE2d at 528 (holding that decisions about the extent and
place of a child's education are vested in the custodial parent); Esteb, 244 P at 268 (holding that because the custodial parent knows the child's "character and ability," she is in a
better position than the non-custodial parent to determine the child's education).
45 Mnookin and Weisberg, Child, Family, and the State, § 5 at 951 (cited in note 5)
(describing the various parental responsibilities implicated by possessing "legal custody").
46 See, for example, Esteb, 244 P at 268 (holding that because a mother is the custodial parent, she knows the child's "character and ability" and is in position to determine
the child's education).
47 See, for example, Glass v Glass, 37 SW2d 467, 468 (Mo App 1931) (describing a
custody decree that gave the father only temporary physical custody, but conferred upon
him the ability to choose which school the child would attend).
48 Consider Taylor v Taylor, 176 NE2d 640, 643-44 (Ill App 1961) (holding that the
right of the non-custodial parent to choose the child's school does not infringe on the custodial parent's right to choose the child's religion, even when the non-custodial parent
refuses to choose a parochial school in accord with the custodial parent's religion); Glass,
37 SW2d at 468 (holding that the non-custodial parent's power to select the child's school
does not contradict the custodial parent's custody, unless the selected school is a boarding
school, and thus takes the child out the care and custody of the custodial parent).
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custodial parent's control and influence over the child's education
by petitioning to protect the child's best interests.49 At least one
court has held that the noncustodial parent can override the custodial parent's right to control education upon an affirmative
showing of physical or mental injury to the child. 50 At a minimum, educational quality serves as one of many factors in the
best interests calculus. 51 Even under the difficult "affirmative
showing" standard-using educational quality as a possible
source of mental injury, for instance-noncustodial parents
might be able make good-faith claims for modification of custody
decrees based on the child's best interests with regard to educa2
tion.5
II. ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE INTERACTION BETWEEN
NCLB AND CUSTODY MODIFICATION
A. The Substantial Interplay between NCLB and Traditional
Custody Modification Standards
If a child of divorced parents attends a school that the state
has marked for "improvement" under NCLB's provisions, the
child's family may face contentious custody modification hearings. NCLB's school transfer provisions may allow the noncustodial parent to relitigate custody under either the best interests or
the substantial change in circumstances standards, regardless of
whether the custodial parent decides to transfer the child.
Furthermore, a federal statutory basis for educational quality might provide a pretextual justification for noncustodial parents to attempt to transfer their child to schools nearer to them.
If the noncustodial parent has retained control over decisions
regarding the child's education, she may be able to create a
change in circumstances by transferring the child to a school
nearer to her, without properly considering the quality of education that her child will receive at a new school. Even if the noncustodial parent retains only partial control over educational decisions, she could attempt such a pretextual move, shielding her
49 See, for example, Frizzell v Frizzell, 323 P2d 188, 192 (Cal App 1958) (holding that
despite generally giving the custodial parent power to determine what school the child

will attend, a trial court may usurp that power if it will serve the best interests of the
child).
50 See Von Tersch, 455 NW2d at 136.
51 See Beers v Beers, 710 A2d 1026, 1209-10 (Pa Super 1998) (affirming a trial court's
use of school quality as relevant to the relative advantages between custody arrangements and the best interests of the child).
52 See id.
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actual motivation from the custodial parent. Thus, NCLB might
provide a pretext for noncustodial parents who are not genuinely
concerned about their child's education, but wish to regain cus53
tody, to move their child nearer to them.
Three problematic incentives result from the interaction of
NCLB with the common law custody modification standards.
First, a noncustodial parent may have incentives t) relitigate
custody if the state classifies her child's school as failing. The
interplay of NCLB and custody modification may also provide
confusing incentives for a custodial parent, pushing him to use
the possibility of future custody relitigation as a factor in deciding whether or not to transfer his child to a different school. Finally, courts may use NCLB data as a proxy for deciding the best
interests of the child, thus encouraging both custody relitigation
on the part of the noncustodial parent and poor educational decisionmaking on the part of the custodial parent.
Analyzing several hypothetical custody situations provides
the best way to demonstrate the possible interactions between
the NCLB school choice provisions and the common law custody
modification standards. This Comment presents four situations,
based on one underlying factual pattern. Assume a scenario
where two divorced parents, who have one child, live twenty
miles apart from one another within one school district.5 4 Assume further that the state has marked the school that the child
currently attends for improvement, and the child-who lives in a
low-income family and whose mother retains physical and legal
custody-has the choice to transfer schools within the district. In
such a situation, four separate scenarios could arise, depending
on the actions of the custodial parent and on the custody modification standard used in the jurisdiction. The custodial parent
could either transfer the child or not, and the jurisdiction might
employ either a substantial change in circumstances standard or
a best interests standard. These two bifurcations lead to the four
possible scenarios outlined below.

53 This outcome is not necessarily contrary to the best interests of the child, of course,
if the subsequent increase in educational quality outweighs the detrimental effects of
relitigation and shift in custody. Since such a beneficial balance of interests will not always exist, however, the creation of pretextual justifications is still worth mentioning.
54 A scenario such as this might be possible in a large rural district, or a particularly
diffuse urban area such as Chicago (which extends over twenty-two miles from north to
south).
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1.

Transferand a substantialchange in
circumstances standard.

If the custodial parent decides to transfer the child to another school not marked for "improvement," in a jurisdiction using a substantial change in circumstances standard, the noncustodial parent may have an incentive to relitigate custody on the
ground that the move to a new school creates a substantial
change in circumstances. If the new school is located a significant distance away from the custodial parent's home, the noncustodial parent could make this argument in good faith.5 5 Because
the change in circumstances standard remains rather vague, the
facts of this scenario could give the noncustodial parent another
chance to have a court determine the appropriate custody arrangement.5 6 Indeed, courts have considered the effects of long
commutes in custody modification cases.5 7
Under this scenario, a real danger results from the possible
incentives created for the parents, regardless of the merits of relitigation. A rehearing under this fact pattern (or any of the four
delineated) would involve substantial court inquiry and balancing of interests. 58 The resulting drain on judicial capacity might
or might not be more significant than that which occurs in any
custody hearing, and the negative effects of a long commute
might or might not justify uprooting the child's home life. 59 But
even if the relitigation lacks any chance of success for the noncustodial parent, and the trial court is able to resolve the balancing of interests easily, the change in circumstances resulting
from the school transfer might provide an attractive-and quite
possibly good faith-cause of action. Thus, a noncustodial parent

55 See Glass v Glass, 37 SW2d 467, 469 (Mo App 1931) (noting that a boarding
school-because of its long distance from the custodial parent-can deprive the custodial
parent of rightful custody).
56 Consider Vasterling, 67 Wash U L Q at 930 (cited in note 29) (arguing that the
substantial change in circumstances standard is indeterminate and is not a deterrent to
relitigation).
57 See, for example, In the Interest of ZBP and JNP, 109 SW3d 772, 779 (Tex App
2003) (taking a long commute into account in balancing a child's interests).
58 See Mnookin and Weisberg, Child, Family, and the State, § 5 at 997-98 (cited in
note 5) (noting that some courts, when modifying custody arrangements under a substantial change in circumstances standard, balance child welfare against finality of judgments, and consider a broad range of facts, including those outside of the knowledge of
the original trial court).
59 See ZBP, 109 SW3d at 778-79 (balancing a long commute and children's wishes
against home environments of varying stability).
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could use a transfer merely to harm a custodial parent, 60 either
61
out of vengeance or misguided good faith.
The custodial parent would face problematic incentives as
well. The change in circumstances resulting from a school transfer would derive from an ostensibly positive, child-focused decision by the custodial parent, but would create dangerous incentives for the parent not to transfer his child. This incentive could
arise out of the fear of facing renewed custody litigation. A dilemma for custodial parents thus looms. A parent who fears
transferring her child to a new school because of the increased
possibility of custody litigation may consider harming the child's
education by keeping him in a "failing" school. 62 But as shown in
the next scenario, litigation might proceed irrespective of
whether the parent transfers the child.
2.

No transfer and a substantialchange in circumstances
standard.

If the custodial parent decides not to transfer his child from
the "failing" school in a jurisdiction using a change in circumstances standard, the parent may still face a custody modification rehearing. For instance, the noncustodial parent could relitigate the custody decree based on the argument that the child's
school's recent classification as "failing" constitutes a substantial
change in circumstances, on the basis that such a classification
describes the educational quality of that school. 63 Such an argument might rely on decisions that have treated a modification of
the educational situation of a child as constituting a substantial
change in circumstances,6 or decisions that require provision of
60 See Ferrer v Lopez, 610 NW2d 229 (Wis App 1999) (unpublished) (analyzing
whether aspects of a divorce litigation were pursued in bad faith, or to "exact revenge" on
a party).
61 Determining whether such litigation was being used for vengeful purposes-in
other words, whether it was merely being used to maliciously harass the custodial parent-would most likely require factual findings sufficient to determine intent. See id.
62 John Charles Boger, Education's "Perfect Storm"?: Racial Resegregation, HighStakes Testing, and School Resource Inequities: The Case of North Carolina,81 NC L Rev
1375, 1417 (2003) (noting the apparent empirical connection between attending a school
with a higher socioeconomic composition and improvements in achievement test scores).
Many children given the option of school transfer under NCLB will be from schools with
lower socioeconomic composition. Thus, the probability of decreased achievement test
scores cited here represents the kind "harm" to the child that might result when a parent
chooses not to pursue transfer.
63 See, for example, Cassano v Cassano, 612 NYS2d 160, 162 (NY 1994) (holding that
differences in educational quality should be a factor considered in the determination of
custody).
64 See, for example, Gardiniv Moyer, 575 NE2d 423, 427 (Ohio 1991) (holding, with-
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a certain level of education, predicated on the state interest in an
educated citizenry. 65 Although some cases in which educational
quality has been relevant to a change in circumstances have involved home-schooling6 6 or unaccredited institutions,6 7 the addition of a federal statutory justification for finding that the current school is failing might provide better support for a court's
shift in custody. NCLB might give family court judges an easy
anchor, a label which indicates clearly whether a given school is
adequate. The NCLB school classification itself thus may provide
noncustodial parents with an incentive to relitigate custody under a change in circumstances standard, even when the custodial
parent avoids transferring her child.
In this situation, a shift in custody based on a substantial
change in circumstances might actually serve the best interests
of the child, but deciding this issue would again require significant court inquiry and balancing. 68 Such an inquiry might require the court to directly analyze the precise level of improvement needed in the current school-that is, how close the school
is to the "failing" line-and then weigh the school's lack of educational quality against the detrimental effects of a custody shift,
69
such as loss of neighborhood, friends, and stability.
Under the NCLB school choice provisions, this complex balancing may cause judges to adopt inappropriate shortcuts.
Though balancing educational quality and family stability lies
within judicial capacity, 70 in this context it stems from a government-imposed educational standard. Thus, courts might determine custody by relying on a measure not designed for that purout addressing the propriety of home schooling per se, that mother's move to home school
children could constitute a substantial change in circumstances).
65 See, for example, Vandiver v HardinCounty Board of Education, 925 F2d 927, 931
(6th Cir 1991), citing Murphy v Ark, 852 F2d 1039, 1043-44 (8th Cir 1988).
66 See, for example, Gardini,575 NE2d at 424-25 (describing custodial mother's decision to home school child).
67 See, for example, Peterson v Peterson, 474 NW2d 862, 868-69 (Neb 1991) (addressing the educational implications of custodial mother's decision to enroll her child in an
unaccredited school, although eventually holding that enrollment in such a school did not
in itself mandate a change in custody).
68 See Mnookin and Weisberg, Child, Family, and the State, § 5 at 997-98 (cited in
note 5) (noting considerable balancing of interests under the substantial change in circumstances standard).
69 See Bodne v Bodne, 588 SE2d 728, 730 (Ga 2003) (Sears concurring) (noting that in
determining whether to relocate a child, the court must consider factors including: "a
child's relationship with the non-custodial parent; his ties to local schools and friends; the
child's age; [and] the stress and instability of relocation and the corresponding benefits of
consistency and stability for the child").
70 See Beers v Beers, 710 A2d 1206, 1209-10 (Pa Super 1998) (balancing educational
quality against family stability in determining a child's best interests).
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pose. Judges might use school quality data as a numerical proxy
for specific educational harm affecting the children that attend a
given school, rather than as a mere measure of whether that
school needs improvement. Thus, judges would make custody
determinations using a measure that is arguably both inaccurate
and overbroad.
Even if courts consider the school's "failure" to be the change
in circumstances, rather than the school's change in classification to "failing," (a big difference from a governmental intervention standpoint), the NCLB data dictates a numerical cutoff for
defining failing schools.7 1 This cutoff creates a non-individualized
proxy for determining custody modification upon which judges
could over-rely.7 2 It may be that a school's failure warrants reopened custody proceedings, but a court might use NCLB data to
the detriment or exclusion of the complex balancing of interests
that should occur, most specifically between educational quality
and family stability. Even in a scenario where NCLB data is not
treated as dispositive in determining a substantial change in circumstances, the numerical certainty of the data might lead
courts to overvalue it in their interest-balancing, leaning them
towards a significant custody modification without inquiring further as to specific educational harm to the child at hand.
3.

Transfer and a best interestsstandard.

In a third scenario, if the custodial parent decides to transfer
his child to another school and the court employs a best interests
of the child standard, the noncustodial parent could relitigate
custody. If the new school is significantly closer to the noncustodial parent's home than to the custodial parent's home, the noncustodial parent could make a best interests argument that a
long commute time disserves the best interests of the child, and
thus the child should live with the noncustodial parent.7 3 Such
an argument could arise in two ways. First, the noncustodial
71 See 20 USC § 6311(b)(2)(E)(i)-(ii) (requiring that the starting point for determining
adequate yearly progress be defined according to the state's lowest achieving groups of
students, for example those among the economically disadvantaged, or the bottom 20
percent of schools, based on performance).
72 Consider Carolyn J. Frantz, Note, EliminatingConsiderationof ParentalWealth in
Post-Divorce Child Custody Disputes, 99 Mich L Rev 216, 230 (2000) (arguing that trial
courts may overvalue easily quantifiable factors such as parental wealth because of their
numerical "certainty"). Judges may overvalue NCLB educational data, due to its easily
quantified nature, in much the same way that they overvalue wealth.
73 See ZBP, 109 SW3d at 778-80 (stating that stability resulting from reduced commute is relevant to a best interests inquiry).
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parent could claim that the addition of a long commute to the
best interests calculus shifts the weight of the factual circumstances and militates in favor of a change in custody. 74 Second,
the noncustodial parent could attempt to make an affirmative
showing that the long commute physically or mentally harms the
75
child.
Creating these possible grounds for relitigation might damage family stability, and thus the child's welfare, if they provide
an incentive for the noncustodial parent to pursue a custody
modification unnecessarily. A petition based on the best interests
of the child standard might enable the noncustodial parent to
have another chance for the court to hear her case.7 6 Moreover,
the possibility of relitigation may act as an incentive for the custodial parent not to transfer his child to an ostensibly better
school. In such a case, the paradox is that any educational benefits potentially derived from NCLB would be lost when the custodial parent decides not to transfer his child, in order to avoid
further custody litigation.
4.

No transferand a best interestsstandard.

The fourth scenario arises when the custodial parent does
not transfer her child in a jurisdiction using a best interests of
the child standard. This situation would provide ample opportunity for the noncustodial parent to relitigate custody, and would
create incentives for the noncustodial parent to pursue custody
modification solely on the basis of her child's school receiving a
NCLB failing classification. Caselaw has shown that despite significant deference to parents' educational choices for their children,77 courts aim to establish a minimum quality of education
for children and may modify custody decrees to guarantee that
minimum level. 78 A noncustodial parent could raise claims either
74 Id.
75 See, for example, Gardini,575 NE2d at 427 (using an affirmative harm standard

which allows the party seeking custody decree modification to show that "some action by
the custodial parent" endangered or would endanger the child) (emphasis added). Under
such a standard, it appears that a significant enough commute could conceivably represent an affirmative harm, though no caselaw seems to approach long commutes under
such a standard.
76 Consider Frizzell v Frizzell, 323 P2d 188, 191-92 (Cal App 1958) (allowing trial
courts substantial latitude to employ the best interests of the child standard in modifying
custody decrees).
77 See, for example, Pierce v Society of the Sisters, 268 US 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding
that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees to a parent the right to direct the education
of her child).
78 Consider Gardini, 575 NE2d at 427; Care and Protection of Charles et al, 504
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using educational quality as a factor in the best interests calculus, 79 or under an affirmative showing standard, which requires
demonstration of harm.8 0 The school's failure under NCLB could
act either as justification for a reweighing of the child's interests
8
or as an easily quantifiable showing of harm. '
The possibility of relitigation arising from this fourth scenario shows that, given certain factual circumstances, the noncustodial parent could seek a modification of custody under the
best interests standard, regardless of whether the custodial parent transfers her child. This possible claim may provide noncustodial parents with the incentive to pursue a mistaken, and potentially harmful, custody modification; but it may also create a
dilemma for custodial parents who wish to provide their children
with a quality education but who also want to avoid destabilizing
82
litigation.
B.

No Child Left Behind Impacts Divorced Parents and
Their Children in a Disproportionate, Biased, and
Wasteful Manner

The foregoing analysis demonstrates that NCLB's public
school choice provisions have a strong impact on divorced parents and their children. Regardless of whether the custodial parent transfers the child, or whether the court employs a best interests or substantial change in circumstances standard, the
NE2d 592, 598-99 (Mass 1987) (holding that parents hold a basic right in controlling the
education of their children that must be reconciled with the state's interest in guaranteeing an educated citizenry).
79 See, for example, Cassano, 612 NYS2d at 162 (stating that any real differences in
educational quality among a child's school options should factor into the determination of
custody).
80 See, for example, Von Tersch v Von Tersch, 455 NW2d 130, 136 (Neb 1990) (requiring an affirmative showing of harm to trump the custodial parent's control of the child's
education).
81 See Part II A 2 (noting the relevance of educational quality to custody decrees and
discussing the possible ways a failing classification under NCLB might affect decree
modification).
82 One might argue that this dilemma may exist even in the absence of NCLB classifications and school quality data, simply on the basis that the school is failing and that
the custodial parent should have a duty to her child's education. But in a public school
system based around neighborhood schools, one imagines that transferring a child from
school to school to escape "failure" is not frequently allowed, at the risk of having a constantly shifting public school population. Furthermore, it would be absurd to require a
custodial parent to take the more extreme option, constantly moving her residence to gain
the benefits of a quality neighborhood school. Thus, the NCLB transfer provisions and
quality data allow this decisionmaking dilemma to exist, by creating the necessary factual circumstances, namely easy school transfer combined with obvious statistical labels
relevant to determining whether transfer is warranted.
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noncustodial parent likely can relitigate the custody decree when
the state classifies the child's school as failing. This incentive for
relitigation can threaten family stability, a goal that most courts
consider desirable in serving the best interests of most children.8 3
Moreover, two factors exacerbate the destabilizing effects of
relitigation. First, the mere classification of a school carries with
it the possibility of litigation, irrespective of the custodial parent's actions.8 4 Second, under NCLB, the classification of failing
schools is cyclical.8 5 Because states continually analyze annual
school data to determine which schools are "failing" under
NCLB 6-certain populations of students may attend multiple
schools receiving "failing" classifications. In other words, a child
might transfer from a failing school only to have her new school
fail a year or two later, beginning the cycle again. If the mere
classification of a school as failing constitutes a valid basis for a
custody modification claim, this cyclical re-classification system
will cause certain families to face the possibility of constantly reopened avenues of litigation.8 7 Moreover, if the emotional impact
of litigation is itself significant, then cyclical recurrence of litigation may harm children and families significantly due to the prolonged conflict and continual indeterminacy of the custody arrangement and the constant repetition of the litigation process.
Yet, the destabilizing effects of cyclical litigation may be
overstated, for two reasons. First, the set of factual circumstances that might lead to such cyclicality is rather limited.8 8
Furthermore, the obviously destabilizing effects of cyclical litigation, in combination with family courts' systematic disfavoring of
modifying custody decrees,8 9 will likely discourage courts from
any such repeated modification.
83 See, for example, ZBP, 109 SW3d at 778 (using "the stability of the home or proposed placement" as determinative in reviewing a custody modification order).
84 See Part II A85 See 20 USC § 6316(b)(1)(A)-(B) (stating that any school that fails to make adequate
yearly progress for any two consecutive years after the passage of the law will be identified for school improvement, and requiring annual analysis of progress).
s6 See id (requiring local educational agencies to monitor annually the progress of
schools); Illinois State Board of Education, No Child Left Behind: Timeline, available
online at <http://www.isbe.state.il.us/nclb/htmls/timeline.htm> (visited May 3, 2004)
(delineating the state's plan for annual monitoring of school progress).
87 The fact pattern which would lead to continuous relitigation is rather narrow and
not particularly probable: School A fails, non-custodial parent gains custody and moves
child to School B, which fails, allowing the previous custodial parent to reopen litigation
to regain custody and move the child to School C (or back to School A after adequate
yearly progress), which then fails, and so on.
88 See note 82.
89 See note 34 and accompanying text.
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But the problem is subtler than the mere increased possibility of litigation. Two salient critiques of NCLB as it affects divorced parents and their children exist. First, the NCLB school
choice provisions have a disparate impact on both divorced custodial parents generally, and on low-income divorced women specifically. Second, the use of a federalized program of educational
standards in determining heavily fact-specific custody cases may
produce issues of judicial methodological bias. This bias could
arise either through the non-individuation of custody claims, or
through institutional capacity concerns regarding courts' ability
to balance children's best interests against parental gamesmanship.
The disparate impact of the NCLB school choice provisions is
almost certainly inadvertent; indeed, the NCLB provision which
requires priority for low-income families has positive implications for distributive justice.90 The statute impacts divorced parents and low-income women, however, by placing them in difficult decisionmaking scenarios that non-divorced parents never
face. Likewise, though the judicial methodological bias against
custodial parents impacted by NCLB may be incidental, it may
nonetheless have a tangible effect, and is certainly remediable.
Finally, though judicial capacity questions of increased litigation
or improper non-individuated balancing of interests are largely
untested quantitatively, their possible impact remains significant.
1.

Disproportionateeffect on divorced custodialparents and
low-income women.

NCLB may impact divorced custodial parents disproportionately as compared to non-divorced parents. Congress likely did
not intend this disparate impact, 91 but nonetheless, the public
school choice provisions of NCLB do not result in a significantly
greater chance of litigation for all parents. Rather, the increased
chance of litigation affects divorced parents specifically. A custodial parent may have to make a decision between transferring
her child to a faraway school, risking loss of custody, opening
herself up to litigation, or all three. These problematic options do
90 See Pub L 107-110, 115 Stat 1425 (2001) (introducing the NCLB as "[ain Act to
close the achievement gap with accountability, flexibility, and choice, so that no child is
left behind") (emphasis added); 20 USC § 6316(b)(1)(E)(ii) (giving priority to the lowestperforming, "low-income" children).
91 See id.
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not accompany a non-divorced parent's decisionmaking process
when faced with the choice of public school transfer. Furthermore, in any given scenario, the no-win aspect of the dilemma
may not be immediately obvious, and dangerous incentives may
affect parental decisionmaking (for instance, by forcing a parent
to choose not to transfer her child to a better school because of
the fear of custody relitigation).
Proponents of the NCLB school transfer system might provide justifications for this disparate impact. First, they might
claim that often custody relitigation is beneficial, in that changing schools might serve the best interests of the child. This objection is inapposite. The fact that school transfer may benefit a
given child does not vitiate the possibly harmful effects flowing
from relitigation (or even from mere incentives to relitigate).
Furthermore, even if the courts regard a school's failure under
the NCLB guidelines as relevant in custody disputes, significant
balances of interests still play into a custody determination. Familial stability-which constant cyclical litigation affects-can
weigh more heavily in the calculus of a child's interests than
does a specific gain in educational quality. 92 NCLB data may be
relevant in this balancing of interests, but the problem of disparate impact stems from the fact that only divorced parents are
faced with problematic incentives outlined above. Accordingly,
even if NCLB data is used in custody modification, at least the
aspects which create disparate impact should be remedied or accounted for.
NCLB proponents might also assert that the limited and incidental disparate effect on divorced parents should not raise
concern. As a statutory matter, however, disparate impact in the
application of the law. can be remedied easily-an amendment
blocking custody relitigation on the merits of NCLB classifications would vitiate the otherwise thorny problem. If such a blanket remedy would prohibit relevant use of NCLB action, then,
even in the absence of congressional action, a judicial standard
requiring an affirmative showing of harm might alleviate some of
the more recurrent problems. Therefore, even if the problems
resulting from NCLB's disparate impact are small or incidental,
they can warrant analysis and can be easily remedied.
In a directly related manner, NCLB may also disproportionately affect low-income women. Custody determinations tend to
92 See ZBP, 109 SW3d at 778-80 (holding that stability resulting from a "traditional
family environment" and a reduced commute is determinative in custody modification).
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favor mothers. 93 NCLB targets children from low-income families
as the primary candidates for school transfer. 94 Thus, the decisions that NCLB levies regarding the children of divorced custodial parents will likely impact low-income women disproportionately. This becomes extremely problematic, especially in relation
to the fourth scenario, where the custodial parent does not transfer the child and the court uses a best interests of the child standard.95 If a poor mother does not transfer her child, she may face
litigation, the loss of her child, enforced lengthy school-commute
distances, 96 or a combination of all three.
This effect raises possible Equal Protection issues. A Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim could arise if a state
creates a public education system for its citizens but systematically denies to a certain class of citizens equal opportunity to
utilize the benefits of that system. 97 The systemic problems levied against poor mothers-and the concomitant effects on the
children involved-do perhaps target a protected class.
Yet these constitutional claims are unlikely to succeed. First,
wealth is not a suspect class subject to heightened scrutiny, 98
and will not stand as the basis for such a claim. Second, though
invidious gender-based classifications receive intermediate constitutional scrutiny, 99 NCLB does not present a facial case of discrimination against women. First, it does not only affect women;
just many women. Second, NCLB does not expressly target
women at all; there is no statutory link between income, which
NCLB does address, and gender, and no mention of divorce in
the statute. Thus, NCLB does not facially discriminate against

93 See Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S Cal Rev
L & Women's Studies 133, 177 (1992) (noting that "judges often tend to favor mothers
over fathers for custody," though qualifying this by arguing that judges favor women who
conform to their perceptions of proper mothers).
94 20 USC § 6316(b)(1)(E)(ii).
95 See Part II A 4.
9 This factor would likely only appear, however, where the trial judge determines
that educational quality from an improved school outweighs the detrimental effect from a
long commute.
97 See McMahon, 33 U of Louisville J of Fam L at 739 (cited in note 37) (citing Plyler
v Doe, 457 US 202, 223 (1982)).
98 See San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 29 (1973)
(noting that the Supreme Court has never considered wealth discrimination to be a valid
basis for invoking strict scrutiny, and vitiating the use of wealth as a suspect class under

Equal Protection analysis).
99 Adarand ConstructorsInc v Pena, 515 US 200, 247 (1995) (noting that courts apply
intermediate scrutiny to cases of invidious gender discrimination).

625]

IMPACT OFNCLB ON CUSTODY MODIFICATION

645

women, and the statute serves the legislative purpose of improving public education for less fortunate children. 0 0
A constitutional claim based on race would not survive, either. Among American single-mother families, approximately 3.2
million live below the poverty line, 1 1 and of those families, almost 1.3 million are African American.' 0 2 Though all of these
families do not involve divorce, the racial balance might create a
basis for a possible race-based constitutional claim. Upon closer
look, however, such a claim similarly fails. The statute does not
facially discriminate on the basis of race; in fact, it makes no
mention of race in the provisions that specify which students receive priority in the school transfer system. 10 3 The Supreme
Court has struck down statutes where other factors serve as obvious proxies for race, even when conveying a purported benefit, 10 4 but here the benefit is not pretextual, the intent is educational benefit, 0 5 and the interaction with divorce law was almost
certainly unforeseen.
Finally, parents bringing such an equal protection claim
against NCLB might lack standing. To have standing, lowincome divorced women would have to show that they have suffered a concrete injury. 10 6 The increased probability of cyclical
litigation may not constitute an injury in itself. Furthermore,
proving a causal link between any claimed injury and the government's actions may prove difficult. Constitutional claims
therefore likely fail both on substantive and procedural grounds.
100See id at 246 (explaining that a "legitimate" legislative purpose cuts against requiring an act to satisfy a demanding level of scrutiny).
101See U.S. Census Bureau, Region, Division and Type of Residence - Poverty Status
for Families With Related Children Under 18 by Family Structure: 2002 Below 100% of
Poverty - All Races, Current Population Survey, 2003 Annual Social and Economic Supplement
(U.S.
Census
Bureau
2003),
available
online
at
<httpJ/ferret.bls.census.gov/macro/032003/pov/new45_100_O1.htm> (last modified Sept
26, 2003) (visited May 3, 2004).
102 See U.S. Census Bureau, Region, Division and Type of Residence - Poverty Status
for Families With Related Children Under 18 by Family Structure: 2002 Below 100% of
Poverty - Black Alone, Current Population Survey, 2003 Annual Social and Economic
Supplement
(U.S.
Census
Bureau
2003),
available
online
at
<httpJ/ferret.bls.census.gov/macro/032003/pov/new45_100_-06.htm> (last modified Sept
26, 2003) (visited May 3, 2004).
103 See 20 USC § 6316(b)(1)(E)(ii) (giving priority only to "the lowest achieving children from low-income families").
104 Consider Yick Wo v Hopkins, 118 US 356 (1886) (reversing a conviction of a Chinese national under a statute that, though facially neutral, was applied in a manner
oppressive of Chinese nationals),
105 See 20 USC § 6301.
106 See Warth v Seldin, 422 US 490, 508-09 (1975) (holding that citizens do not have
standing as a group of low- and moderate-income individuals, because their injury is not
sufficiently particular and causally related to the governmental action).
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The overall disparate impact, however, warrants at the very
least legislative and judicial attention, despite the lack of constitutional injury. A custody modification hearing involving a lowincome mother necessarily forces a court to undergo a complex
balancing of interests that requires careful study of current levels of familial stability and review of available educational
choices. 10 7 This complexity, and the use of judicial resources that
it requires, militates against ignoring the impact of NCLB on
low-income single mothers, despite the fact that these effects are
incidental to the primary purpose of NCLB. 08 In fact, because a
custody rehearing may serve the best interests of the child and
the balancing of interests may present detailed and fact-specific
questions, either a legislative remedy or a preemptive judicial
standard is necessary to ensure that custody modifications based
on NCLB school classification are truly appropriate. Such an approach would take into account the disparate impact of NCLB on
divorced parents while addressing the second problem outlined
below-judicial methodological bias.
2.

Methodological bias.

Bias may occur in using statistical measures and test scores
to determine not just school efficacy, but also the custodial
placement of individual children. Because NCLB impacts custody
modification laws by effectively forcing a litigable situation, the
statute provides the basis for litigation on statistical measures
that were not designed for the purpose of assisting in child custody modifications. Thus, using NCLB findings may lead courts
to decide the custody of children according to a measure not designed for that purpose. This unintended use of NCLB findings
could result in both a poorly-fit remedy and governmental overreaching.
Two problems could arise from the impact of NCLB school
classifications on custody relitigation. First, the existence of easily quantifiable data may encourage over-reliance by the judiciary on NCLB school classifications in determining a child's best
interests.' 0 9 One might argue that such reliance is both justified
107 See ZBP, 109 SW3d at 778-80 (holding family stability as determinative in custody
dispute); Peterson, 474 NW2d at 868-69 (analyzing whether a mother's enrollment of her
child in unaccredited school represented an affirmative harm to the child).
108 See Part II B 1 (introducing a scenario that challenges the position that incidental
effects of the NCLB are of no concern).
109 See Frantz, 99 Mich L Rev at 230 (2000) (cited in note 72) (arguing that trial
courts may overvalue easily quantifiable factors such as parental wealth because of their
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and efficient because it allows judges to more easily weigh educational quality in the best interests calculus. Even if this position
has some merit, it demonstrates the second problem resulting
from the use of NCLB data in custody modifications: a possible
lack of individualized judicial analysis. Efficiency may advance
judicial goals, but the use of n-inimally relevant data as a proxy
for a child's best interests does not. Judges must avoid the temptation to give disproportionate weight to NCLB classifications
when analyzing educational quality, despite their easily calculable nature under NCLB.
Another methodological critique of NCLB's impact on divorced parents stems from concerns regarding the institutional
capacity of family courts. Because the NCLB school choice provisions effectively force a litigable situation, courts may have to
devote more resources to custody modification hearings. Moreover, because the test scores and statistical methods of NCLB are
not designed for use in the analysis necessary in custody determinations, they provide little guidance for courts attempting to
rely on them in custody decisions. Thus, NCLB can drain the resources of family courts, resulting in less accurate decisions in
NCLB cases, as well as in all other cases before the courts.
Whether the family courts will suffer under the burdens of
potentially increased levels of custody relitigation is unclear, because the NCLB school transfer provisions have only recently
taken effect. 110 Any predictions about capacity issues are just
that-predictions. The critique of judicial capacity will be much
more effective, for instance, in an ex post analysis of divorce
court caseload data over the next five years. Furthermore, it
stands to reason that judges regularly deal with these sorts of
balancing acts when new laws change the amount or character of
cases on their docket. Therefore, it is unclear whether NCLB will
generate a significant burden.
Judicial capacity concerns not relating to caseload, however,
are also worth monitoring. First, one significant concern stems
from the ability of judges to analyze and weigh complex educational data. Thus, NCLB classifications may provide incentives
for the judiciary to over-rely on more easily quantifiable data,"'
and may also encourage more expert testimony and analysis,
numerical "certainty").
1,0 See, for example, No Child Left Behind: Timeline (cited in note 86).
"I, See Part II B 2 (discussing methodological bias and possible judicial over-reliance
on numerical proxies).

648

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2004:

thus lengthening custody modification hearings and taxing judi2
cial capacity in the aggregate."
Second, a more subtle capacity concern arises out of possible
gamesmanship by noncustodial parents. The worries of cyclical
litigation expressed above 113 will become a reality if noncustodial
parents can use NCLB school classifications as a basis for relitigating custody. This theory of increased litigation, however, can
only be borne out over time and across various jurisdictions, after
collecting the empirical data necessary to evaluate these claims.
Still, the issues of disparate impact and bias remain relevant
and imminent. The most obvious objection to the claims of disproportionality lies in the fact that within the custody modification context NCLB will probably negatively affect only a small
percentage of the population (though that assertion could
strengthen the constitutional critique by further crystallizing the
definition of the affected class). Regardless, the combined effects
do not alleviate the impending possibility of custody relitigation
flowing from NCLB school transfers, and the lack of guidance
available to judges concerning equitable incorporation of the
NCLB school transfer provisions into custody modification proceedings will have forthcoming effects on that relitigation.
Even if courts should pay attention to the harms that might
result from the disparate impact of NCLB on divorced parents,
one might argue that within the population of citizens most affected-low-income families--concerns of constant litigation are
implausible and may be precluded largely due to expense. There
is little downside to developing a preventative solution in advance, however. Furthermore, the concerns about cyclical relitigation and problematic decisionmaking incentives may nonetheless affect some number of divorced parents, even if those parents are not low-income. This could occur for two reasons. First,
even if a child is low-income for the purpose of NCLB, the noncustodial parent may have the resources and incentives to relitigate custody. Second, and less narrowly, even if both parents are
low-income, the problematic incentives created by NCLB, outlined above, may motivate custodial parents to make counterpro112 See Edward V. DiLello, Fighting Fire with Firefighters:A Proposal for Expert
Judges at the Trial Level, 93 Colum L Rev 473, 477-78 and n 32-35 (1993) (noting that
.expert testimony causes delay in a number of different contexts," and using child custody
battles as a particularly "compelling example of delay and expense" caused by using experts that lengthen trials needlessly).
113 See Part II B (arguing that the constant reclassification of schools under NCLB
may result in cyclical patterns of relitigation).
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ductive educational decisions, or motivate noncustodial parents
to mistakenly relitigate.

III. POSSIBLE LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL REMEDIES
As suggested earlier, three clear remedies might alleviate
the problems of disparate impact, bias, and waste flowing from
the intersection of NCLB and modern divorce law. First, through
a full statutory remedy, Congress could completely repeal the
NCLB school transfer provisions. This is worth mentioning only
briefly in the abstract, since eliminating the statute would quite
simply eliminate the problems flowing from it. Second, Congress
could implement a partial statutory remedy, amending the
school transfer provisions to directly address custody issues.
Such an amendment could take many forms and would likely
create complex implementation issues, but might result in substantial national uniformity of outcome. Finally, courts could
pursue a judicial solution-a judge-made standard or standards
for dealing with custody modifications that turn on NCLB school
transfers.
A.

Partial Statutory Remedies

One possible solution for the problems raised above would
stem from a partial amendment of the NCLB statute. Such an
amendment could have varying degrees of stringency; it could
either specify the role of NCLB school classifications in determining custody decrees, mandating their use as a factor in a best
interests calculus, or it could create a broad prohibition on using
NCLB data as a dispositive or even relevant basis for modifying
custody decrees.
1.

Specific factor-baseduse of NCLB data.

Under a legislative amendment that mandated the use of
NCLB data as a factor in custody determinations, one substantial benefit would emerge: custody litigation based on that data
would assume a higher degree of national uniformity, simplifying
such custody disputes to a certain extent. This uniformity would
help eliminate some problematic incentives weighing on judicial
capacity, but would crystallize the incentives for noncustodial
parents to bring suit on the basis of their child's NCLB school
classification.
Three significant obstacles, though, would still exist. First,
because individual states create their own divorce law, such an
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amendment would raise significant problems of federalism. A
federal statutory amendment specifying the use of state data in
state litigation would amount to a federal determination of a
state cause of action, which may be a logical impossibility. Second, a legislative amendment specifically permitting the use of
NCLB data in custody modifications would not eliminate all of
the problems of methodological bias raised above. Though it
would at least tailor the use of NCLB information, it would still
encourage judicial habits of non-individualized analysis. Third, a
limited amendment of this sort would not curb problems of cyclical litigation. Instead, it would facilitate the noncustodial parents' claims for custody by specifying the proper use of NCLB
school classifications. The amendment could prevent this effect
by limiting the number of possible claims a noncustodial parent
could raise in relying on NCLB, but such a quantified limit
would present awkward conflicts between judicial capacity concerns and children's rights to have their best interests deter14
mined.1
2.

Prohibitionof the use of NCLB data.

The second possible limited legislative amendment would
create a broad prohibition on the use of NCLB school classifications or school quality data in litigating custody modifications.
This remedy would have a number of positive effects: it would
eliminate the risk of cyclical litigation, it would fully alleviate
the judicial capacity problems created by increased custody relitigation, and it would obviate any possible claims of disparate
impact. Such an amendment, however, would be dramatically
overinclusive and might infringe on parents' and children's
rights. A blanket prohibition on the use of NCLB classifications
in custody litigation quite possibly might bar a significant number of valid custody claims; for instance, in some cases, a child's
school may be bad enough that the child should be transferred
against the custodial parent's wishes, thus requiring a change in
custody. By blocking claims, such a statutory remedy would preclude any analysis of the child's best interests, significantly limiting potential litigants' rights. A statutory remedy of this sort
could be structured so as not to block valid best interests claims
that would have existed even without the NCLB label-that is,
114 Note, though, that the UMDA, § 409, 9A ULA 439 (1998 & Supp 1999), does have a
ban on modification within two years of the initial custody decree.
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where the child attends a school which is objectively and independently bad. In fact, a statute could even be structured as a
presumption against relitigation, rather than a blanket prohibition on claims. But even so, a statutory approach would embody
the most significant drawback inherent to all legislative remedies, namely the slow response time of the political process, as
contrasted with the case-by-case flexibility of the judiciary. A
statutory amendment would create uniformity more quickly
upon actual passage of the law, but courts could implement a
judicial remedy immediately, without deliberation.
B.

Judicial Remedy

The courts can implement the most responsive and balanced
solution to the problems of disparate impact, bias, and waste.
Because the current family law regime already incorporates substantial balancing tests-in determining changes in circumstances or best interests--courts should adopt a more limiting
standard, such as a specific presumption, rather than merely
folding NCLB into the balance of interests without forethought.
Accordingly, courts could require that in custody modification
cases flowing from the NCLB school transfer provisions, the noncustodial parent must make an affirmative showing of harm, beyond the harm resulting from the mere classification of the
child's school as "failing." This standard would encourage a more
comprehensive balancing of the child's interests, and would
eliminate the incentives both for judges to over rely on numerical
proxies and for noncustodial parents to relitigate custody frivolously.
Requiring an affirmative showing of harm would lessen the
power of NCLB school classifications to force litigation, by disallowing litigation based on the proposition that a child per se suffers harm if his school is classified as failing. An affirmative
showing standard discourages litigation by raising the threshold
bar for a valid claim. This raised bar may alleviate much of the
disproportionate effect on divorced parents and low-income
mothers, although this is a speculative empirical claim. In addition, it could reduce methodological bias by actually requiring
judges to balance the child's other interests against the school's
educational quality rather than relying on a proxy.
To ensure the effectiveness of an affirmative showing standard, courts also could adopt a rebuttable presumption against
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redundant litigation. 115 Once a parent had litigated a custody
decree because of a NCLB school classification, courts could
adopt a strong presumption against relitigation of the same custody decree on the same grounds. This would provide security
and stability for children while eliminating the incentives for
cyclical litigation in all but the most egregious of cases-where
educational quality remains so poor that it clearly trumps other
concerns, and thus rebuts the presumption.
The application of an affirmative showing standard in conjunction with a rebuttable presumption against redundant relitigation would also alleviate concerns about judicial capacity.
Courts arguably incorporate an informal standard similar to this
when they systematically disfavor custody modification, 11 6 but
formalizing the standard would guarantee an explicit elimination
of incentives to over-rely on NCLB school data in analyzing custody determinations.
CONCLUSION

The implementation of NCLB's school choice provisions may
have significant and unexpected consequences for low-income
families affected by divorce. The incentives created by the interaction of NCLB and the common law custody modification standards engender substantial concerns about disparate impact and
117
methodological bias for divorced parents and their children.
The best solution to these problems lies in a judicial standard
that requires an affirmative showing of harm before a court will
modify a custody decree on the basis of NCLB school quality
classifications. Likewise, the addition of a rebuttable presumption against redundant litigation addresses concerns of cyclical
religitation and gamesmanship on the part of noncustodial parents. Thus, a reasonably simple solution can remedy a fairly
complex problem. This solution would minimize problematic incentives and difficult parental judgment calls while allowing
courts to continue to protect the best interests of children.
115See n 34 and accompanying text.
116

Id.

The critiques relating to discrimination and bias against divorced parents (excluding federalism concerns) are relevant in any school choice program. Even if a given school
does not receive a failing classification, litigation could proceed on the grounds that the
best interests of the child could be recalculated using the easily quantifiable and comparable school data used in determining whether each school is failing-that is, merely
whether one school "scored" better than another. These universal problems, however,
generally are resolved by applying an affirmative showing of harm standard.
117

